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Abstract—In this paper, we study the decentralized parallel
multiple access channel (MAC) when transmitters selfishly max-
imize their individual spectral efficiency by selecting a single
channel to transmit. More specifically, we investigate the set
of Nash equilibria (NE) of decentralized networks comprising
several transmitters communicating with a single receiver that
implements single user decoding. This scenario is modeled as a
one-shot game where the players (the transmitters) have discrete
action sets (the channels). We show that the corresponding game
has always at least one NE in pure strategies, but, depending
on certain parameters, the game might possess several NE. We
provide an upper bound for the maximum number of NE as a
function of the number of transmitters and available channels.
The main contribution of this paper is a mathematical proof
of the existence of a Braess-type paradox. In particular, it is
shown that under the assumption of a fully loaded network,
when transmitters are allowed to use all the available channels,
the corresponding sum spectral efficiency achieved at the NE is
lower or equal than the sum spectral efficiency achieved when
transmitters can use only one channel. A formal proof of this
observation is provided in the case of small networks. For general
scenarios, we provide numerical examples that show that the
same effect holds as long as the network is kept fully loaded.
We conclude the paper by considering the case of successive
interference cancellation at the receiver. In this context, we
show that the power allocation vectors at the NE are capacity
maximizers. Finally, simulations are presented to verify our
theoretical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
In their original definition [2], multiple access channels
(MAC) correspond to a communication scenario where several
transmitters communicate with a single receiver trough a com-
mon channel. In parallel MAC, each transmitter can exploit a
common set of orthogonal (sub)channels to communicate with
the receiver. Often, channel orthogonality is assumed in the
frequency domain, and thus, channels can be understood as
different non-overlapping frequency bands. This model allows
one to study communication scenarios such as 802.11-based
wireless local area networks (WLANs) [3], [4], distributed
soft or hard handovers in cellular systems [1], or throughput-
maximizing power control in multi-carrier code division mul-
tiple access (MC-CDMA) systems [5].
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In this paper, we analyze the parallel MAC assuming that
transmitters selfishly maximize their individual spectral effi-
ciency (ISE) by autonomously selecting a single channel to
perform their transmission. Here, the channel selection policy
is not imposed by the receiver to the transmitters, which
justifies the terms decentralized parallel MAC. The motivation
for studying this scenario and, in particular, the limitation
of using a single channel for transmitting, stems from the
fact that this is often a practical constraint in some wireless
networks, for instance, Wi-Fi networks. Moreover, the choice
of enforcing radio devices to use only a subset of all the
available channels has been proved to be beneficial in the
case of rate-efficient centralized parallel MAC when using
successive interference cancellation [1]. In the case of energy-
efficient decentralized parallel MAC, it has been shown that
using a single channel is a dominant strategy [5]. Within
this framework, we study this scenario, to which we refer
to as channel selection (CS) problem, using a one-shot game
model. The players (the transmitters) have discrete action sets
(the channels) and their utility function (performance metric)
corresponds to their ISE. Our interest focuses on the analysis
of the set of Nash equilibria (NE) [6] of this game. The
relevance of the NE relies, in part, on the fact that it describes
a network state where the channel used by each transmitter is
individually optimal with respect to the channels adopted by
all the other transmitters in the network. Another reason is that
an NE can be reached in a fully decentralized fashion when
radio devices interact during certain time following particular
behavioral rules [7], [8].
We distinguish the CS game described above from the power
allocation (PA) game. In the PA game, transmitters can simul-
taneously use all the available channels, and thus, the set of
actions is a convex and closed set [9]. Indeed, the PA problem
in decentralized parallel MAC has been well investigated
in the wireless literature [9]–[13]. In these works, the main
contribution consists in conducting a complete analysis of the
set of NE of the corresponding one-shot games. Nonetheless,
very few is known about the set of equilibria in decentralized
parallel MAC, with CS policies. As we shall see, by dropping
the convexity of the set of actions, fundamental differences
arise. For instance, the uniqueness of the NE no longer holds.
Although the parallel MAC is, in terms of signal model, a
special case of the MIMO (multiple input multiple output)
interference channel (IC), the NE analysis conducted in [14]–
[18] does not directly apply to the case of parallel MAC. First,
[10], [11] address the case of fast fading links and shows
substantial differences especially in terms of the uniqueness of
the NE. This reveals the importance of the channel coherence
time. Second, even if identical channel variation models are
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2considered, the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the
NE derived in [14], [19] for static or block fading IC, can be
shown to hold with probability zero in parallel MAC [9].
Within this context, the main contributions of this paper are
described hereunder.
• The set of NE of the decentralized parallel MAC is fully
described in the case of CS policies and single user
decoding at the receiver. This set is shown to be non-
empty and an upper bound of its cardinality is provided
as a function of the number of transmitters and available
channels.
• In the 2-transmitter 2-channel case, it is formally proved
that for any realization of the channel gains, there always
exists at least one NE in the CS game that produces a
higher or equal network spectral efficiency (NSE) than the
unique NE in the PA game. In wireless communications,
this kind of observations is often associated with a
Braess type paradox [20] as in [21]–[23], where similar
observations have been made in other scenarios. For an
arbitrary number of transmitters and channels, we only
provide numerical results that support the aforementioned
claim.
• The set of NE of the decentralized parallel MAC is
also studied in the asymptotic regime, that is for a large
number of transmitters in the case of CS policies. In
this context, we provide closed-form expressions of the
fraction of players which transmit over each channel as
a function of the ratio between the channel bandwidth
and the total available bandwidth (sum of all channel
bandwidths).
• Finally, we show show that in the case of successive
interference cancellation (SIC), the power allocation vec-
tors at the NE of the PA and CS games are capacity
achieving. We provide both the power allocation vectors
and the corresponding individual transmission rates at the
NE such that the maximum NSE is achieved.
The content of this paper can be briefly summarized as follows.
In Sec. II, the system and game models are described. In
Sec. III, we revisit the existing results regarding the PA
problem and we provide new results on the CS problem in
terms of existence and uniqueness of the NE. In Sec. IV, the
contribution aforementioned are fully detailed. In Sec. V, we
present simulation results in order to verify our theoretical
results. The paper is concluded by Sec. VI.
II. MODELS
A. System Model
Let us define the sets K 4= {1, . . . ,K} and S 4= {1, . . . , S}.
Consider a parallel multiple access channel with K trans-
mitters and S subchannels (namely non-overlapping bands).
Denote by y = (y1, . . . , yS)
T the S-dimensional vector
representing the received signal, which can be written in the
baseband at the symbol rate as follows
y =
K∑
k=1
Hkxk +w. (1)
Here, ∀k ∈ K, Hk is the channel transfer matrix from trans-
mitter k to the receiver, xk is the vector of symbols transmitted
by transmitter k, and vector w represents the noise observed at
the receiver. We will exclusively deal with the scenario where
the matrices Hk are S-dimensional diagonal matrices (parallel
MAC), i.e., Hk = diag (hk,1, . . . , hk,S). In our analysis,
block fading channels are assumed. Hence, for each channel
use, the entries hk,s, for all (k, s) ∈ K×S , are time-invariant
realizations of a complex circularly symmetric Gaussian ran-
dom variable with zero mean and unit variance. Here, we
assume that each transmitter is able to perfectly estimate its
own channel realizations (coherent communications), i.e., the
channels hk,1 . . . hk,S . The vector of transmitted symbols xk,
∀k ∈ K, is an S-dimensional complex circularly symmetric
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and covariance
matrix P k = E
(
xkx
H
k
)
= diag (pk,1, . . . , pk,S). Assuming
the transmit symbols to be Gaussian and independent is
optimal in terms of spectral efficiency, as shown in [24], [25].
For all (k, s) ∈ K × S , pk,s represents the transmit power
allocated by transmitter k over channel s and transmitters are
power-limited, that is,
∀k ∈ K,
S∑
s=1
pk,s 6 pk,max, (2)
where pk,max is the maximum transmit power of transmit-
ter k. A PA vector for transmitter k is any vector pk =
(pk,1, . . . , pk,S) with non-negative entries satisfying (2). The
noise vector w is an S-dimensional zero mean Gaussian ran-
dom variable with independent, equal variance real and imag-
inary parts. Here, E
(
wwH
)
= diag
(
σ21 , . . . , σ
2
S
)
, where, σ2s
represents the noise power over channel s. We respectively
denote the noise spectral density and the bandwidth of channel
s by N0 and Bs, thus, σ2s = N0Bs. The total bandwidth is
denoted by B =
∑S
s=1Bs.
B. Game Models
The PA and CS problems described in Sec. I can be
respectively modeled by the following two non-cooperative
static games in strategic form (with i ∈ {a, b}):
G(i) =
(
K,
(
P(i)k
)
k∈K
, (uk)k∈K
)
. (3)
In both games, the set of transmitters K is the set of play-
ers. An action of a given transmitter k ∈ K is a partic-
ular PA scheme, i.e., an S-dimensional PA vector pk =
(pk,1, . . . , pk,S) ∈ P(i)k , where P(i)k is the set of all possible
PA vectors which transmitter k can use either in the game G(a)
(i = a) or in the game G(b) (i = b). An action profile of the
game i ∈ {a, b} is a super vector
p = (p1, . . . ,pK) ∈ P(i),
3where P(i) is a set obtained from the Cartesian product of all
the action sets, i.e., P(i) = P(i)1 × . . .× P(i)K , where,
P(a)k =
{
(pk,1, . . . pk,S) ∈ RS : ∀s ∈ S, pk,s > 0,∑
s∈S
pk,s 6 pk,max
}
, and (4)
P(b)k = {pk,max es : ∀s ∈ S, es = (es,1, . . . , es,S) ,
∀r ∈ S \ s, es,r = 0, and es,s = 1} . (5)
In the sequel, we respectively refer to the games G(a) and
G(b) as the PA game and CS game. Let us denote by p−k any
vector in the set
P(i)−k
4
= P(i)1 × . . .× P(i)k−1 × P(i)k+1 × . . .× P(i)K (6)
with (i, k) ∈ {a, b}×K. For a given k ∈ K, the vector denoted
by p−k represents the strategies adopted by all the players
other than player k. With a slight abuse of notation, we can
write any vector p ∈ P(i) as (pk,p−k), in order to emphasize
the k-th component of the super vector p. The utility for player
k in the game G(i) is its spectral efficiency uk : P(i) → R+,
and
uk(pk,p−k) =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2 (1 + γk,s) [bps/Hz], (7)
where γk,s is the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR)
seen by player k over its channel s, i.e.,
γk,s =
pk,sgk,s
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{k}
pj,sgj,s
, (8)
and gk,s , |hk,s|2. Note that from (8), it is implied that single-
user decoding (SUD) is used at the receiver. The choice of
SUD is basically due to scalability (in terms of signaling cost)
and fairness for the decoding scheme. Clearly, optimality is
not sought here, nonetheless, these constraints are inherit to
the decentralized nature of the network.
As a solution concept for both G(a) and G(b), we focus on
the notion of NE [6], which we define, using our notation, as
follows,
Definition 1 (Pure Nash Equilibrium): In the non-
cooperative games in strategic form G(i), with i ∈ {a, b}, an
action profile p ∈ P(i) is a pure NE if it satisfies, for all
k ∈ K and for all p′k ∈ P(i)k , that
uk(pk,p−k) > uk(p′k,p−k). (9)
The relevance of the NE is that at such state, the PA or CS
policy chosen by any transmitter is optimal with respect to the
choice of all the other transmitters. Thus, in a decentralized
network, the NE is a stable network state, since no player has
a particular interest in deviating from the actual state.
In the following, we provide some fundamental results which
we use in the further analysis of the games G(a) and G(b).
III. AUXILIARY RESULTS
In this section, we introduce some existing results on the
existence and uniqueness of the NE in the games G(a) and
G(b). For doing so, we use the fact that both games G(a) and
G(b) have been shown to be potential games (PG) [26], [27]
in [1] and [28], respectively. We conclude this section, by
introducing a new result which allows us to establish an upper
bound on the number of NE that the game G(b) might possess.
A. General Results
The analysis presented in the following strongly relies on
the fact that both games G(a) and G(b) are potential games.
Thus, for the sake of completeness, we define exact PG using
our notation.
Definition 2 (Exact Potential Game): Any game in strate-
gic form defined by the triplet
G = (K, (Pk)k∈K , (uk)k∈K)
is an exact potential game if there exists a function φ (p) for
all p ∈ P = P1 × . . . × PK such that for all players k ∈ K
and for all p′k ∈ Pk, it holds that
uk(pk,p−k)− uk(p′k,p−k) = φ(pk,p−k)− φ(p′k,p−k).
Now, from the definition of the utility functions (7) and Def.
2, the results proved by the authors in [1] and [28] follow
immediately.
Lemma 1: The strategic form games G(i), with i ∈ {a, b},
are exact potential games with potential function
φ(p) =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s +
K∑
k=1
pk,sgk,s
)
. (10)
The relevance of PG relies on the fact that it is a class of
games for which the existence of at least one pure NE is
always guaranteed [26]. Additionally, many known learning
procedures, such as, best response dynamics, fictitious play
and some reinforcement learning dynamics converge in PG.
As a consequence, any of these dynamics can be used to
implement algorithms to achieve an equilibrium in a fully
decentralized fashion. Nonetheless, we leave the design of
decentralized techniques for achieving NE out of the scope
of this paper and we focus on the analysis of the equilibria.
We refer the interested reader to [7], [8], [13], [14], [29] for
more details. In the following, we use Prop. 1 to analyze the
set of NE of both our power allocation game G(a) and our
channel selection game G(b).
B. Known Results Concerning the Power Allocation Game
G(a)
In the following, we comment on the existence and unique-
ness of the NE in G(a).
41) Existence of a NE: Regarding the existence of pure NE,
the following proposition is an immediate consequence of our
Lemma 1 and Lemma 4.3 in [26].
Proposition 3 (Existence of a pure NE): The game G(a)
has always at least one NE in pure strategies.
Regarding the existence of a mixed NE (i.e., a probability
distribution on the possible actions which verifies Definition
1), it follows from [30], that the existence of at least one NE in
mixed strategies always exists. This is basically because the ac-
tion spaces, P(a)k are compact spaces and the utility functions
are continuous with respect to the action profile. However,
in compact strategy spaces, mixed strategies are generally less
attractive due to the difficulty of its implementation in wireless
communications systems [8].
2) Uniqueness of the pure NE: In the game G(b), the
uniqueness of the NE has been shown to hold with probability
one [9].
Theorem 4 (NE uniqueness in parallel MAC): The game
G(a) has almost surely a unique pure NE.
A formal proof of Theorem 4 is provided in [9]. This proof
is based on the concept of degeneracy which allows one to
characterize the directions along which the potential remains
constant. A simpler proof, for the special case of 2 -players
and 2-channels is given in [31].
3) Determination of the NE: From Def. 2, it follows that
the unique NE in pure strategies, denoted by p†, is the unique
solution of the following optimization problem:
arg max
p∈P(a)
φ (p) . (11)
The components of the PA vector p† in (11) are for all (k, s) ∈
K × S,
p†k,s =
BsB 1βk −
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{k}
p†j,sgj,s
gk,s

+
, (12)
where, βk is a Lagrangian multiplier chosen to saturate
the power constraints (2). Note that this result shows the
connections between the notion of NE and the well-known
water-filling PA policy [13]. For a further discussion on this
connection, the reader is referred to [7], [8].
C. New Results Concerning the Channel Selection Game G(b)
In the game G(b), it can be checked that given a vector
p−k ∈ P(b)−k, it follows that ∀k ∈ K and ∀pk ∈ [0, pk,max],
the potential function satisfies that φ
(
pk es,p−k
)
6
φ
(
pk,max es,p−k
)
, where es = (es,1, . . . , es,S) ∈ RS ,
∀r ∈ S \ s, es,r = 0, and es,s = 1. Thus, the problem
of transmit power control disappears and there is no lost of
generality by choosing the action sets as P(b)k . Technically, the
main difference between G(a) and G(b) is that the latter is a
finite game (|K×S| < +∞). In the following, we investigate
the consequences of this fact on the existence and multiplicity
of the NE .
1) Existence of a pure NE: Regarding the existence of at
least one NE in pure strategies, we have that from our Prop.
1 and Corollary 2.2 in [26], the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5 (Existence of a pure NE): The game G(b)
has always at least one NE in pure strategies.
Regarding the existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies,
we have that given that the actions sets are discrete and finite,
then the existence of at least one NE in mixed strategies is
ensured [6].
2) Multiplicity of the pure NE: In the following, we intro-
duce a new result that allows us to determine that the NE in
the game G(b) is not necessarily unique.
Proposition 6: Let Kˆ ∈ N be the highest even number
which is less or equal to K. Then, the game G(b) has L pure
NE strategy profiles, where,
1 6 L 6 1 + (S − 1)
∑
i∈{2,4,...,Kˆ}
(
K
i
)
. (13)
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in Appendix A. An
interesting point in Proposition 6 is that it shows that the
property of uniqueness in the game G(a) no longer holds
(Theorem 4 ). By quantizing the set of actions, the game
loses the uniqueness property for the NE. The upper bound
of the number of NE in Proposition 6 does not depend on
the realizations of the channel gains but only on the number
of transmitters K and available channels S. As we shall see,
when the exact realizations of the channels are known, then
the exact number of NE can be identified. Nonetheless, relying
only on the number of transmitters K and number of channels
S, the tightest upper bound is given by Proposition 6.
3) Determination of the NE: In order to fully identify the
action profiles corresponding to an NE, we use the graph G
described in the proof of Proposition 6 in Appendix A. Ba-
sically, we convert the non-directed graph G into an oriented
graph Gˆ whose adjacency matrix is the non-symmetric square
matrix Aˆ whose entries are ∀(i, j) ∈ I2 and i 6= j,
aˆij =
{
1 if i ∈ Vj and φ
(
p(j)
)
> φ
(
p(i)
)
0 otherwise ,
(14)
and aˆi,i = 0 for all i ∈ I.
From the definition of the matrix Aˆ, we have that a necessary
and sufficient condition for a vertex vi to represent an NE
action profile is to have a null out-degree in the oriented graph
Gˆ, i.e., there are no outgoing edges from the node vi (sink
vertex). Finally, one can conclude that determining the set of
NE in the game G(b) boils down to identifying all the sink
vertices in the oriented graph Gˆ. In Fig. 4, we show an example
of the non-directed G and oriented Gˆ graphs for the case where
K = 3 and S = 2. Note that this method can be used only to
determine the whole set of NE. It does not pretend to be an
algorithm which can be directly implemented in decentralized
wireless networks, since it requires complete information at
each transmitter. Methods for achieving equilibria in wireless
networks are described in [7], [8], [13], [14], [29].
5IV. EQUILIBRIUM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND
SPECIAL CASES
In this section, we study in detail two special cases of rel-
evant interest to understand previous conclusions and provide
more insights into decentralized power allocation problem in
terms of design. First, the games G(a) and G(b) are studied
assuming that there exist only K = 2 transmitters and S = 2
available channels. In particular, we analyze the set of NE
action profiles of both games and compare the network spectral
efficiency (NSE), U (i) : P(i) → R, obtained by playing both
games. Here, for all i ∈ {1, 2},
U (i)(p1, . . . ,pK) =
K∑
k=1
uk(p1, . . . ,pK) [bps/Hz]. (15)
From this analysis, we conclude that from a network perfor-
mance point of view, limiting the transmitters to use a unique
channel brings a better result in terms of network spectral
efficiency (15). Second, we consider the case of a large number
of transmitters. This study leads to two important conclusions:
(i) the fraction of players using a given channel depends
mainly on the bandwidth of each channel and not on the exact
channel realization nor the number of players and channels;
(ii) in the asymptotic regime (K →∞) both games exhibit the
same performance. Before we start, let us introduce the notion
of best response correspondence, since it plays a central role
in the following analysis.
Definition 7 (Best-Response Correspondence): In
a non-cooperative game described by the 3-tuple(K, (Pk)∀k∈K , (uk)∀k∈K), the relation BRk : P−k → Pk
such that
BRk
(
p−k
)
= arg max
qk∈Pk
uk
(
qk,p−k
)
, (16)
is defined as the best-response correspondence of player k ∈
K, given the actions p−k adopted by all the other players.
A. The 2-Transmitter 2-Channel Case
Consider the games G(a) and G(b) with K = 2 and S = 2.
Assume also that ∀k ∈ K, pk,max = pmax and ∀s ∈ S, σ2s =
σ2 and Bs = BS . Denote by SNR =
pmax
σ2 the average signal
to noise ratio (SNR) of each active communication.
1) The power allocation game: Let us denote by p† =(
p†1,p
†
2
)
the NE of the game G(a). Then, following Def. 1,
one can write the following set of inclusions,
∀k ∈ K, p†k ∈ BRk
(
p†−k
)
. (17)
Note that, for all k ∈ K and for all p−k ∈ P(a), the
set BRk
(
p−k
)
is a singleton (Def. 7) and thus, (17) repre-
sents a system of equations. By solving the resulting system
of equations (17) for a given realization of the channels
{gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S , one can determine the NE of the game G(a).
We present such a solution in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 (Nash Equilibrium in G(a)): Let the action
profile p† =
(
p†1,p
†
2
)
∈ P(a), with p†1 =
(
p†11, pmax − p†11
)
and p†2 =
(
pmax − p†22, p†22
)
be an NE action profile of the
game G(a). Then, with probability one, p† is the unique NE
and it can be written as follows:
• Equilibrium 1: if g ∈ B1 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
1+SNRg11
1+SNRg22
, g21g22 6
1+SNRg11
1+SNRg22
}, then, p†11 = pmax and
p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 2: if g ∈ B2 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
1+SNR (g11 + g21) ,
g21
g22
> 1+SNR (g11 + g21)}, then,
p†11 = pmax and p
†
22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 3: if g ∈ B3 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
1
1+SNR(g12+g22)
, g21g22 6
1
1+SNR(g12+g22)
} then, p†11 = 0
and p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 4: if g ∈ B4 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
1+SNRg21
1+SNRg12
, g21g22 >
1+SNRg21
1+SNRg12
}, then, p†11 = 0 and p†22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 5: if g ∈ B5{g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
g21
g22
, 1+SNRg111+SNRg22 <
g21
g22
< 1 + SNR (g11 + g21)}, then,
p†11 = pmax and p
†
22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2g22 +
σ2+g11pmax
g21
)
.
• Equilibrium 6: if g ∈ B6{g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
g21
g22
, 11+SNR(g12+g22) <
g11
g12
< 1+SNRg111+SNRg22 }, then, p
†
11 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2g11 +
σ2+pmaxg22
g12
)
and p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 7: if g ∈ B7 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
g21
g22
, 1+SNRg211+SNRg12 <
g11
g12
< 1 + SNR (g11 + g21)}, then,
p†11 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2+pmaxg21
g11
+ σ
2
g12
)
and p†22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 8: if g ∈ B8{g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
g21
g22
, 11+SNR(g12+g22) <
g21
g22
< 1+SNRg211+SNRg12 }, then, p
†
11 = 0
and p†22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2+g12pmax
g22
+ σ
2
g21
)
.
Proof: See Appendix B
In Fig. 2 we plot the different types of NE of the game G(a) as
a function of the channel ratios g11g12 and
g21
g22
. Note that under
the knowledge of all channels, the set of all possible pure
NE can be obtained by simply placing the point
(
g11
g12
, g21g22
)
in Fig. 2 . The uniqueness of the NE is not ensured under
certain conditions. In fact, infinitely many NE can be observed,
however, the conditions for this to happen are zero probability
events, as we shall see.
Proposition 9: Let α
4
= g11g21 =
g12
g22
and assume that the set
of channels {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S satisfies the following conditions
1
1 + pmaxσ2 (g12 + g22)
< α < 1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) ,
Then, any PA vector p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22) ∈
P(a), such that
p11 =
1
2
(
pmax (1− α) + σ2
(
1
g12
− 1g11
))
+ αp22
is an NE action profile of the game G(a).
The proof of Prop. 9 is the first part of the proof of Prop. 8. In
the next subsection, we perform the same analysis presented
above for the game G(b).
2) The channel selection game: When K = 2 and S = 2,
the game G(b) has four possible outcomes, i.e.,
∣∣P(b)∣∣ = 4.
We detail such outcomes and its respective potential in Fig.
1. Following Def. 1, each of those outcomes can be an NE
depending on the channel realizations {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S , as
shown in the following proposition.
6Tx1\Tx2 p2=(pmax,0) p2=(0,pmax)
p1=
(pmax,0)
1
2
log2(σ2+pmax(g11+g21))
+1
2
log2(σ2)
1
2
log2(σ2+pmaxg11)
+1
2
log2(σ2+pmaxg22)
p1=
(0,pmax)
1
2
log2(σ2+pmaxg12)
+1
2
log2(σ2+pmaxg21)
1
2
log2(σ2+pmax(g12+g22))
+1
2
log2(σ2)
Fig. 1. Potential function φ of the game G(a), with K = 2 and S = 2.
Player 1 chooses rows and player 2 chooses columns.
Proposition 10 (Nash Equilibria in G(b)): Let the PA vec-
tor p∗ = (p∗1,p
∗
2) ∈ P(b) be one NE in the game G(b). Then,
depending on the channel gains {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S , the NE p∗
can be written as follows:
• Equilibrium 1: when g ∈ A1 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
1
1+SNRg22
and g21g22 6 1+SNRg11}, then, p∗1 = (pmax, 0)
and p∗2 = (0, pmax).
• Equilibrium 2: When g ∈ A2 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 > 1 +
SNRg21 and g21g22 > 1 + SNRg11 }, then, p∗1 = (pmax, 0)
and p∗2 = (pmax, 0).
• Equilibrium 3: when g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ A3{g ∈
R4+ :
g11
g12
6 11+SNRg22 and
g21
g22
6 11+SNRg12 }, then, p∗1 =
(0, pmax) and p∗2 = (0, pmax).
• Equilibrium 4: when g ∈ A4 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6 1 +
SNRg12 and g21g22 >
1
1+SNRg12
}, then, p∗1 = (0, pmax)
and p∗2 = (pmax, 0).
Proof: The proof follows immediately from Def. 1 and
Tab. 1.
In Fig. 3, we plot the different types of NE action profiles as
a function of the channel ratios g11g12 and
g21
g22
. Note that under
the knowledge of all channels, the set of all possible pure
NE can be obtained by simply placing the point
(
g11
g12
, g21g22
)
in 3. Note how the action profiles p∗ = (pmax, 0, 0, pmax)
and p+ = (0, pmax, pmax, 0) are both NE, when the channel
realizations satisfy that g ∈ A5 = A1 ∩ A4, i.e., A5 = {g ∈
R4+ :
1
1+SNRg22
6 g11g12 6 1 + SNRg21 and
1
1+SNRg12
6
g21
g22
6 1 + SNRg11}. This confirms the fact that several
NE might exists in the game G(b) depending on the exact
channel realization, as stated in Prop. 6. Moreover, one can
also observe that there might exist an NE action profile which
is not a global maximizer of the potential function (10) [32]
(e.g., φ (p∗) < φ
(
p+2
)
).
In the sequel, the performance achieved by the transmitters at
the equilibrium in both games are compared.
B. A Braess Type Paradox
As suggested in [20], a Braess-type paradox refers to a
counter-intuitive observation consisting in a reduction of the
individual utility at the equilibria, when the players are granted
with a larger set of actions. That is, by letting the players to
choose from a larger set of options, their individual benefit
reduces. Recently, the Braess-type paradox has been also
associated with the reduction of the sum-utility instead of
the individual utilities, as in [22], [23], [33] in the wireless
communications arena.
In our particular case, the set of actions for player k in the
game G(b), is a subset of its set of actions in the game G(a),
i.e., ∀k ∈ K, P(b)k ⊆ P(a)k . Interestingly, as observed in
[20], reducing the set of actions of each player leads, in this
particular game, to a better global performance. This effect has
been reported in the parallel interference channel in [21], [22]
under the consideration of particular channel conditions and
later, more generally in [23]. However, a formal proof of the
existence of this paradox is not provided in the aforementioned
references. This observation, has been also reported in the par-
allel MAC for the case of successive interference cancellation
(SIC) in [34]. Nonetheless, the channel in [34] was not fully
decentralized, as it required a central controller to dictate the
channel policy to all the transmitters. In the following, we
study this observation in more detail.
Let us denote by p(†,n)k , the unique NE action profile of game
G(a), when the vector g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ Bn, for all n ∈
{1 . . . , 8}. Let us also denote by p(∗,n) one of the NE action
profiles of game G(b) when (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ An, for all
n ∈ {1, . . . 4}. The sets An and Bn are defined in Prop. 8 and
10. Then, for a finite SNR level, one can observe that ∀n ∈
{1, . . . , 4}, An∩Bn = Bn and ∀g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ Bn,
the following equality always holds p(†,n)k = p
(∗,n)
k , which
implies the same network performance. However, when the
NE of both games are different, one can not easily compare
the utilities achieved by each player since they depend on
the exact channel realizations. Fortunately, the analysis largely
simplifies by considering either a low SNR regime or a high
SNR regime and more general conclusions can be stated. The
performance comparison between games G(a) and G(b) for the
low SNR regime is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 11: In the low SNR regime, both games G(a)
and G(b), with K = 2 and S = 2, possess a unique NE,
denoted by p∗. Here, for all k ∈ K and s ∈ S,
p∗k,s = pmax1{
s= arg max
`∈S
gk,`
} (18)
p∗k,−s = pmax − pk,s. (19)
Proof: See App. C
From, Prop 11, it can be stated that at the low SINR regime,
players achieve the NE by simply choosing the channel with
the highest channel gain independently of the other player’s
action. The performance comparison between games G(a) and
G(b) for the high SNR regime is presented in the following
proposition.
Proposition 12: In the high SNR regime, with K = 2 and
S = 2, the game G(a) has a unique pure NE denoted by p† and
the game G(b) has two pure NE denoted by p(∗,1) and p(∗,4),
respectively. Then, at least for one n ∈ {1, 4}, there exists a
SNR value 0 < SNR0 <∞, such that ∀SNR > SNR0,
2∑
k=1
uk
(
p(∗,n)
)
−
2∑
k=1
uk(p
†) > δ, (20)
and δ > 0.
The proof of Prop. 12 is given in App. D. From the proof of
Prop. 12, it can be stated that in none of the games, players
transmit simultaneously on the same channels. Now, from
Prop. 11 and Prop. 12, it can be concluded that at low SNR
both games G(a) and G(b) induce the same network spectral
7efficiency. On the contrary, the game G(b) always induce a
higher or equal network spectral efficiency than the game G(a)
in the high SNR regime. This counter-intuitive result implies
a Braess type paradox, as suggested in the beginning of this
subsection.
C. The Case of Large Systems
In this section, we deal with the games G(b) for the case
of large networks, i.e., networks with a large number of
transmitters. Within this scenario, the dominant parameter to
analyze these games is the fraction of transmitters using a
particular channel. As we shall see, contrary to the case of
small number of transmitters and channels analyzed in the
previous section, in the case of large networks, each player
becomes indifferent to the action adopted by each of the
other players. Here, each player is rather concerned with the
fractions of players simultaneously playing the same action,
i.e., using the same channel. Hence, one of the interesting
issues to be solved is the determination of the repartition of
the users between the different channels at the NE.
As a first step towards identifying the fractions of transmitters
per channel at the NE, we first re-write the potential (10) as
a function of the vector x(p) = (x1(p), . . . , xS(p)), where
xs(p), with s ∈ S, denotes the fraction of players transmitting
over channel s given the action profile p ∈ P(b). Hence,
∀s ∈ S, xs(p) = |Ks(p)|K
S∑
i=1
xi(p) = 1,
(21)
where Ks(p) ⊆ K is the set of players using channel s given
the action profile p ∈ P(b), i.e., Ks(p) = {k ∈ K : pk,s 6= 0}.
Let bs = BsB denote the fraction of bandwidth associated with
channel s, such that
∑S
s=1 bs = 1. Then, one can write the
potential as follows
φ(p) =
S∑
s=1
bs log2
N0Bs + pmax ∑
k∈Ks(p)
gk,s

= S log2(K) +
S∑
s=1
bs log2
(
NoBs
K
+ xs(p) pmax
 1
|Ks(p)|
∑
k∈Ks(p)
gk,s
 . (22)
Note that the term S log2(K) in (22) does not depend on the
actions of the players. Thus, in the following, we drop it for the
sake of simplicity. We assume that the number of players K
and the available bandwidth B grows to infinite at a constant
rate µ > 0, while the fractions bs, for all s ∈ S are kept
invariant. That is, the average bandwidth per transmitters is
asymptotically constant,
lim
K,B→∞
B
K
= µ. (23)
Thus, under the assumption of large number of transmitters
and for any action profile p ∈ P(b), it follows that,
∀s ∈ S, 1|Ks(p)|
∑
k∈Ks(p)
gk,s
K→∞−→
∫ ∞
0
λdFgs(λ) = Ωs,
where Fgs is the cumulative probability function associated
with the channel gains over dimension s. Hence, for all action
profile p ∈ P(b) adopted by the players, maximizing the
function φ (p) in the asymptotic regime reduces to maximize
the function φ˜ (x(p)),
φ˜ (x(p)) =
S∑
s=1
bs log2 (µNo bs + xs(p) pmax Ωs) .
That is, solving the OP,
max
x=(x1,...,xS)∈RS+
S∑
s=1
bs log2 (µN0 bs + xspmaxΩs) ,
s.t.
S∑
i=1
xi = 1 and ∀i ∈ S, xi > 0,
.
The optimization problem above has a unique solution of the
form,
∀s ∈ S, xs = bs
[
1
βk
− µN0
pmaxΩs
]+
, (24)
where βk is Lagrangian multiplier to satisfy the optimization
constraints. Interestingly, in the case when all the channels are
described with the same statistics, that is, ∀s ∈ S , Fgs(λ) =
Fg(λ), (∀s ∈ S, Ωs = Ω) it holds that,
∀s ∈ S, xs = Bs
B
. (25)
The above provides a very simple relation between the
repartition of the users among the available channels in the
asymptotic regime. Indeed, it can be implied that the number
of transmitters using a given channel s is proportional to
the bandwidth allocated to the corresponding channel. In
particular, note that this result generalize the work in [35].
To conclude on the usefulness of the large system analysis, let
us consider the upper bound on the number of NE which is
given by Proposition 6. Let us normalize the upper bound on
the number of pure NE L in (13) by the total number of pure
(channel selection) strategy profiles, and let us write,
L
SK
< 1
SK
(
1 + (S − 1) 2K) . (26)
Now, for a sufficiently large number K, the following approx-
imation holds,
1
SK
(
1 + (S − 1) 2K) ≈ (S − 1) ( 2S )K . (27)
Although the number of pure NE in channel selection games
my be conjectured to be large, it is in fact relatively small in
the asymptotic regime. Indeed, (27) indicates that when the
number of users is large, the fraction of pure NE goes to zero
whenever the number of channels is greater or equal to 3. This
result shows the difficulty of using methodologies such as the
one proposed in Sec. III-C3 to study the set of NE or the
difficulty of achieving equilibria using decentralized learning
algorithms as proposed in [7], [8].
8D. The Case of Successive Interference Cancellation
In order to analyze the case of successive interference can-
cellation (SIC), let us denote by RSIC (p) the NSE achieved
with SIC assuming perfect decoding given the power alloca-
tion profile p. That is,
RSIC (p) =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
1 +
K∑
k=1
pk,sgk,s
σ2s
 .
Now, the NSE with SIC RSIC (p) can be written in terms of
the potential function (10) as follows,
RSIC (p) =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s +
∑
k∈K
pk,sgk,s
)
−
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s
)
,
= φ(p)−
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
(
σ2s
)
. (28)
From (28), it can be immediately implied that maximizing
the NSE of the parallel MAC under the assumption of perfect
decoding is equivalent to maximize the potential function φ(p)
in (10). This observation and the notion of potential game
(Def. 2) lead us immediately to the following propositions
(assume that player k is decoded in the k-th place) :
Proposition 13: Let p† ∈ P(a) be the unique NE of the
game G(a). The maximum NSE of the network is achieved if
for all k ∈ K, transmitter k uses the power allocation vector
p†k and transmits with rate
R†k =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
K∑
k=1
log2
1 + p
†
k,sgk,s
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{1,...,k}
p†j,sgj,s
 .
A similar result is obtained for the game G(b).
Proposition 14: Let P+ ⊂ P(b) be the set of NE of the
game G(b). The maximum NSE (achievable in the space P(b))
of the network is achieved if for all k ∈ K, transmitter k uses
the power allocation vector p+k and transmits with rate
R+k =
∑
s∈S
Bs
B
K∑
k=1
log2
1 + p
+
k,sgk,s
σ2s +
∑
j∈K\{1,...,k}
p+j,sgj,s
 ,
with p+ ∈ P+ and
∀p ∈ P+, φ(p+) > φ(p). (29)
Prop. 13 and Prop. 14 show that for achieving the maximum
NSE the players must use the power allocation corresponding
to the NE but the transmission rate must be adjusted according
to the decoding order. This implies that each player needs to
know both the SINR with and without SIC in order to set up
its power allocation vector and its transmission rate, respec-
tively. In the context of decentralized networks this amount
of signaling is not always affordable. Thus, in the following
numerical analysis, we only consider the more practical (and
scalable) case of single-user decoding. More discussions on the
unfeasibility of SIC in decentralized networks can be found
in [9].
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the previous sections, a mathematical argument has been
provided to show that at the low and high SNR regime,
using a channel selection policy yields a higher or equal
NSE than using a water-filling power allocation policy. A
formal proof has been provided for the case of K = 2
transmitters and S = 2 channels. Moreover, we highlight that
a CS policy is evidently simpler than a PA policy in terms of
implementation. Unfortunately, providing a formal proof for an
arbitrary number of transmitters K and channels S at a finite
SNR becomes a hard task since it will require to calculate all
the types of NE depending on the exact channel realizations.
Hence, for the case of arbitrary parameters K, S, and SNR,
we provide only numerical examples to give an insight of the
general behavior. First, we evaluate the impact of the SNR for
a network with a fixed number of transmitters and channels.
Second, we evaluate the impact of the network load, i.e., the
number of transmitters per channel for a given fixed SNR.
A. Impact of the SNR pmaxσ2
In Fig. 6 (left), we plot the network spectral efficiency as
a function of the average SNR of the transmitters. Here, it is
shown that in fully-loaded and over-loaded networks, i.e., η =
K
S > 1, the gain in NSE obtained by using a discrete action set
(game G(a)) increases with the SNR. Conversely, for weakly
loaded networks η < 1, limiting the transmitters to use a single
channel appears to be suboptimal as the SNR increases. This is
basically because using only one channel, necessarily implies
letting some interference-free channels unused. Interestingly,
at low SNR, the NSE observed in both games is the same,
independently of the load of the system. In both cases, high
SNR and low SNR regime, the observed results are in line
with Prop. 11 and Prop. 12.
In Fig. 7, we plot the probability of observing a specific
number of NE in the game G(b) for different values of SNR.
In the first case (Fig. 7 (left)) we consider S = 2 and K = 3,
whereas in the second case (Fig. 7 (right)), K = 3 and S = 3.
Note that from Prop. 6, the maximum number of NE is 4 and
7, respectively. However, only 3 and 6 NE are respectively
observed in the simulations. This mismatch is due to the fact
that Prop. 6 relies only on the number of players and channels
and takes into account only the distance (Def. 15) between two
action profiles. Thus, it does not consider the utility function
in (7) and the set of actions P(b), for which there are some
action profiles which are mutually exclusive of the set of NE.
For instance, in the game G(b) with K = 3 and S = 2, the
set of power allocations pmax (e1, e1, e1), pmax (e1, e2, e2),
pmax (e2, e2, e1), and pmax (e2, e1, e2) are all at distance 2 of
each other. Nonetheless, if pmax (e1, e1, e1) is an equilibrium
for a given set of channels, then the other three action sets
are not NE for the same set of channels and vice-versa. Thus,
9only 3 out of the 4 candidates can be NE simultaneously.
The exact number of NE can be determined following the
method described in Sec. III-C3, but it requires the complete
knowledge of the channel gains. Prop. 6 aims at providing an
estimation based only on the parameters K and S.
Finally, we remark that low SNR levels are associated with a
unique NE (with high probability), whereas, high SNR levels
are associated with multiple NE (with high probability). Note
that this observation, at least for the case of K = 2 and S = 2,
is inline with Prop. 11 and Prop. 12.
B. Impact of the Number of Transmitters (K)
In Fig. 6 (right), we plot the NSE as a function of the
number of transmitters per channel, i.e., the system load η =
K
S . Therein, one can observe that for weakly loaded systems
η < 1, playing G(a) always leads to higher NSE than playing
G(b). This is natural since restricting the transmitters to use
only one channel implies not using other channels which are
interference-free, as S > K. On the contrary, for fully-loaded
and over-loaded systems, the NSE of the game G(a) is at least
equal or better than that of the game G(b). Indeed, the fact that
for high system loads η > 2, the NSE obtained by playing the
game G(a) and G(b) become identical stems from the fact that
under this condition the system becomes dominated by the
interference. Finally, in Fig. 5, we show the fractions xs of
transmitters using channel s, with s ∈ S, obtained by Monte-
Carlo simulations and using (25) for a large network with an
asymptotic ratio of players per channel equivalent to η = 10.
Therein, it becomes clear that (25) is a precise estimation of
the outcome of the games G(a) and G(b) in the regime of large
number of players.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, it is shown to what extent the equilibrium
analysis of the decentralized parallel MAC differs from those
conducted for other channels like Gaussian MIMO interfer-
ence channels and fast fading MIMO MAC. In particular,
the special structure of parallel MAC and the assumption of
single-user decoding at the receiver leads to the potential game
property. The channel selection game was merely introduced
in the literature but not investigated in details as it is in this
paper. In particular, a graph-theoretic interpretation is used to
characterize the number of NE. In the case where the number
of transmitters is large, the fraction between pure NE and
the total number of action profiles is relatively small, which
makes both the analysis and the achievability of the NE a
challenging task. Now, from a design point of view, we provide
theoretical results and numerical examples to show that a fully
loaded network, when transmitters use only one channel, can
be more efficient than its counterpart when all the channels
can be exploited by the transmitters. Although all of these
results are encouraging about the relevance of game-theoretic
analyses of power allocation problems, important practical
issues have been deliberately ignored. For example, the impact
of channel estimation is not assessed at all. Also, it is important
to conduct a detailed analysis on the signaling cost involved
by all the power allocation algorithms arising from this game
formulations to learn NE.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
In this appendix, we provide a proof of Proposition 6, which
establishes an upper bound for the number of NE of the game
G(a). Here, we exploit some basic tools from graph theory.
Let us index the elements of the action set P(b) in any given
order using the index n ∈ I = {1, . . . , SK}. Denote by p(n)
the n-th element of the action set P(b). We write each vector
p(n) with n ∈ I, as p(n) =
(
p
(n)
1 , . . . ,p
(n)
K
)
, where for all
j ∈ K, p(n)j ∈ P(b)j . Consider that each action profile p(n) is
associated with a vertex vn in a given non-directed graph G.
Each vertex vn is adjacent to the K(S−1) vertices associated
with the action profiles resulting when only one player deviates
from the action profile p(n), i.e., if two vertices vn and vm,
with (n,m) ∈ I2 and n 6= m, are adjacent, then there exists
one and only one k ∈ K, such that
∀j ∈ K \ {k}, p(n)j = p(m)j , and p(n)k 6= p(m)k .
More precisely, the graph G can be defined by the pair G =
(V,A), where the set V = {v1, . . . , vSK} (nodes) represents
the SK possible actions profiles of the game and A (edges) is
a symmetric matrix (adjacency matrix of G) with dimensions
SK × SK and entries defined as follows ∀(n,m) ∈ I2 and
n 6= m,
an,m = am,n =
{
1 if n ∈ Vm
0 otherwise , (30)
and an,n = 0 for all n ∈ I, where the set Vn is the set of
indices of the adjacent vertices of vertex vn. In the following,
we use the concept of distance between two vertices of the
graph G. We define this concept using our notation:
Definition 15 (Shortest Path): The distance (shortest path)
between vertices vn and vm, with (n,m) ∈ I2 in a given
non-directed graph G = (V, A), denoted by dn,m(G) ∈ N is:
dn,m(G) = dm,n(G) =
K∑
k=1
1{
p
(n)
k 6=p
(m)
k
}. (31)
Here, for any pair of action profiles p(n) and p(m), with
(n,m) ∈ I2 and n 6= m, we have that φ(p(n)) 6= φ(p(m))
with probability one. This is because channel gains are random
variables drawn from continuous probability distributions and
thus, Pr
(
φ(p(n)) = φ(p(m)) | n 6= m) = 0. Hence, following
Def. 1, one can state that if the action profile p(n
∗), with
n∗ ∈ I, is an NE of the game G(b), then, it follows that
∀m ∈ V(n∗), φ(p(n
∗)) > φ(p(m)), (32)
and vice versa with probability one. However, several action
profiles might simultaneously satisfy the condition (32), which
is what we proof in the following.
Proof: From Prop. 5 it is ensured that L > 1. Then,
assume that a given action profile p(n) (vertex vn) with n ∈ I
is an NE. Given condition (32), it follows that none of the
vertices in the set Vn is an NE. Nonetheless, if there exists
another action profile p(m), with m ∈ I \ {n ∪ Vn}, which
satisfies (32), then p(m) can be also an NE. Thus, for the
action profile p(m), with n 6= m, to be an NE candidate,
it must be (at least) at distance two of p(n) and any other
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NE candidate, i.e., dn,m(G) = dm,n(G) ∈ {2, 4, . . . , Kˆ}.
An action profile at distance ` ∈ {2, 4, . . . , Kˆ} from p(n),
is a vector where ` players have simultaneously deviated from
p(n). Hence, for each `-tuple of players, there always exists
S− 1 action profiles at distance ` from p(n) and at distance 2
from each other. Thus, considering the initial NE action profile
p(n), there might exists at most
L 6 1 +
∑
i∈{2,4,...,Kˆ}
(
K
i
)
(S − 1) (33)
NE candidates. This establishes an upper bound for L and
completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROP. 8
In this appendix, we provide a proof for the Prop. 8. The
proof is separated in two steps. First, we show that a power
allocation vector p = (p1,p2) ∈ P(a) of the form
p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) and p2 = (pmax − p22, p22) ,
is not an NE of the game G(a), when p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and
p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[. Second, we show that if p is an NE, then, p
is unique and satisfies that, p ∈ P†, where
P† = P(a) \ {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22)
∈ R4+ : p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[ }.
In the following, we use the notation −c to denote the element
other than c in the binary set C.
Proof: First Step: Assume that the action profile p =
(p1,p2), with p1 = (p11, p12) and p2 = (p21, p22) is an NE
of the game G(a), and assume that for all (k, s) ∈ K × S ,
pk,s > 0, with strict inequality. Then, from the best response
correspondence, it holds that ∀(k, s) ∈ K × S,
p†k,s =
[
1
βk
− σ
2 + g−k,sp
†
−k,s
gk,s
]+
, (34)
with βk a Langrangian multiplier chosen to satisfy (2). Then,
from 34, it can be implied that ∀k ∈ K,
pk,s =
1
βk
− σ
2 + p−k,sg−k,s
gk,s
> 0 and (35)
pk,−s =
1
βk
− σ
2 + p−k,−sg−k,−s
gk,−s
> 0. (36)
Then, from the fact that ∀k ∈ K, pk,s + pk,−s = pmax, we
have that,
pk,k =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2+g−k,k(pmax−p−k,−k)
gk,k
+
σ2+g−k,−kp−k,−k
gk,−k
)
pk,−k = pmax − pk,k.
(37)
Using a matrix notation, the system of equations (37) can be
written as follows:
C
(
p11
p22
)
= A, (38)
where, the matrix C is
C =
(
2g11g12 − (g22g11 + g21g12)
− (g22g11 + g21g12) 2g11g12
)
and, the vector A is
A =
(
pmaxg12 (g11 − g21) + σ2 (g11 − g12)
pmaxg21 (g22 − g12) + σ2 (g22 − g21)
)
. (39)
Note that the system of equations (38) has a unique solution
as long as the set of channels {g11, g12, g21, g22} satisfies the
condition g12g21 − g11g22 6= 0. Let us continue the analysis
under the assumption that, g12g21−g11g22 6= 0 (the case where
g12g21−g11g22 = 0 is treated later). Then, the unique solution
of (38) is ∀k ∈ K,
pk,k =
pmaxg−k,k (gk,−k + g−k,−k)
g12g21 − g11g22
+
σ2 (g−k,k + g−k,−k)
g12g21 − g11g22 ,
pk,−k = pmax − pk,k.
Note that if g12g21 − g11g22 < 0, then ∀k ∈ K, pk,k < 0,
and, if g12g21 − g11g22 > 0, then ∀k ∈ K, pk,k > pmax,
which contradicts the initial power constraints (2). Hence, any
vector p = (p1,p2), with p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) and p2 =
(pmax − p22, p22), such that ∀(k, s) ∈ K×S, 0 < pk,s < pmax
is not an NE for the game G(a) when g12g21 − g11g22 6= 0.
Assume now that g12g21−g11g22 = 0, and let α = g21g11 =
g22
g12
.
Then, the PA vector in (37) can be written as follows, for k = 1{
p11 = αp22 +
1
2
(
pmax (1− α) + σ2
(
1
g12
− 1g11
))
p12 = pmax − p11.
(40)
and, for k = 2,{
p22 =
1
2
(
pmax
(
1 + 1α
)
+ σ2
(
1
g21
− 1g22
))
+ 1αp11
p21 = pmax − p22,
(41)
Note that the first equations in both (40) and (41) are iden-
tical. Thus, we focus only on the first equation in (40).
This implies that any PA vector, p = (p1,p2), with p1 =
(p11, pmax − p11) ∈ P(a)1 and p2 = (pmax − p22, p22) ∈ P(a)2
satisfying the condition
p11 =
1
2
(
pmax (1− α) + σ2
(
1
g12
− 1
g11
))
+ αp22 (42)
is an NE of the game G(a) when g12g21− g11g22 = 0 as long
as ∀(k, s) ∈ K×S , 0 < pk,s < pmax. For satisfying the latter
conditions, it suffices to ensure that: 0 < p11 < pmax when
p22 = 0 and p22 = pmax. Solving these inequalities leads to
the following conditions over the channels:
(i) p11 > 0, when p22 = 0, if
1 + pmaxσ2 g21
1 + pmaxσ2 g12
<
g11
g12
(43)
.
(ii) p11 > 0, when p22 = pmax, if
1
1 + pmaxσ2 (g12 + g22)
<
g11
g12
. (44)
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(iii) p11 < pmax, when p22 = 0, if
g11
g12
< 1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) (45)
(iv) p11 < pmax, when p22 = pmax, if
g11
g12
< 1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) (46)
Finally, we obtain that if the vector of channels g =
(g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfies that
min
(
1
1 + pmaxσ2 (g12 + g22)
,
1 + pmaxσ2 g21
1 + pmaxσ2 g12
)
< α and
max
(
1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) ,
1 + pmaxσ2 g11
1 + pmaxσ2 g22
)
> α,
that is,
1
1 + pmaxσ2 (g12 + g22)
< α < 1 +
pmax
σ2
(g11 + g21) ,
then any vector p = (p1,p2), with p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) ∈
P(a)1 and p2 = (pmax − p22, p22) ∈ P(a)2 satisfying the condi-
tion (42) is an NE of the game G(a). Note that infinitely many
PA vectors might satisfy (42), which implies infinitely many
NE. However, since the channels are realizations of random
variables drawn from a continuous distribution, the probability
of observing a realization such that g12g21 − g11g22 = 0 is
zero. Thus, with probability one, any vector p = (p1,p2), with
p1 = (p11, pmax − p11) and p2 = (pmax − p22, p22), such that
∀(k, s) ∈ K×S , 0 < pk,s < pmax is not an NE for the game
G(a).
Second Step: Consider that p† =
(
p†1,p
†
2
)
∈ P(a) is an
NE. Then, it must follow that p† ∈ P†, where,
P† = P \ {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22)
∈ R4+ : p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[ }
=
8⋃
n=1
P†i ,
where the sets P†n ⊂ P(a), for all n ∈ {1, . . . , 8}
are described as follows. The singletons P†1 = {p =
(pmax, 0, 0, pmax)}, P†2 = {p = (pmax, 0, pmax, 0)}, P†3 =
{p = (0, pmax, 0, pmax)}, P†4 = {p = (0, pmax, pmax, 0)} and
the convex non-closed sets,
P†5 = {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22)
∈ R4+ : p11 = pmax, and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[},
P†6 = {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22)
∈ R4+ : p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 = pmax},
P†7 = {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22)
∈ R4+ : p11 ∈ ]0, pmax[ and p22 = 0},
P†8 = {p = (p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22)
∈ R4+ : p11 = 0, and p22 ∈ ]0, pmax[}.
In the following, we identify the conditions over the channel
vector g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) such that each p† ∈ P†n, with
n ∈ {1, . . . , 8} is an NE.
Assume that p† ∈ P†8 , i.e., p†1 = (0, pmax) and p†2 =(
pmax − p†22, p†22
)
, with p†22 ∈ ]0, pmax[. Then, from (34) with
k = 2, we have that:
p†21 =
1
β2
− σ
2
g21
> 0 and (47)
p†22 =
1
β2
− σ
2 + g12pmax
g22
> 0. (48)
Then, since p†21 + p
†
22 = pmax, we have that
1
β2
=
1
2
(
pmax +
σ2+pmaxg12
g22
+ σ
2
g21
)
, and thus,
p†22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2 + g12pmax
g22
+
σ2
g21
)
, (49)
where, it must satisfy that 0 < p†22 < pmax. The inequality
p†22 > 0, holds only if
g21
g22
<
1+
pmaxg21
σ2
1+
pmaxg12
σ2
, whereas the
inequality p†22 < pmax holds only if
g21
g22
> 11+SNR(g12+g22) .
Similarly, from (34) with k = 1, we have that given p†22, in
order to obtain p†11 = 0 and p
†
12 = pmax, it must hold that
p11 =
1
β1
−
σ2 + g21
(
pmax − p†22
)
g11
6 0 and
p12 =
1
β1
− σ
2 + g22p
†
22
g12
> pmax. (50)
Hence, by doing p12 − p11 in (50), we obtain that:
σ2 + g21
(
pmax − p†22
)
g11
− σ
2 + g22p
†
22
g12
6 pmax. (51)
Then, by replacing (49) in (51), we obtain that the condition
(50) are satisfied only if the channels satisfy that:
g11
g12
6 g21
g22
. (52)
Hence, we can conclude that whenever the vector g =
(g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ B8, the NE is of the form
(p11, pmax − p11, pmax − p22, p22), with p11 = 0 and p22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2+g12pmax
g22
+ σ
2
g21
)
. Now, assuming that p† ∈ P†n,
with n ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, leads to the conditions of the other types
of NE, i.e., the corresponding sets Bn, such that whenever
g ∈ Bn then p† ∈ P†n. It is important to note that, for any
particular vector g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ R4, there exists,
with probability one, only one set Bn which satisfies that
g ∈ Bn. This is basically because for all (n,m) ∈ {1, . . . , 4}2,
with n 6= m, it follows that Bn ∩ Bm = ∅. Now, for
all (n,m) ∈ {5, . . . , 8}2, with n 6= m, it follows that
Bn ∩Bm ⊂ {g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ R4 : g11g22 = g12g21}
and observing a channel realization g, such that, g11g22 =
g12g21 is a zero probability event, since all channel gains are
drawn from continuous probability distributions. Thus, with
probability one, the game G(a) has unique NE. This completes
the proof.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROP. 11
In this appendix, we provide a proof of the Prop. 11. The
Prop. 11 basically states that at low SNR regime if an action
profile p is a NE of the game G(a), then it is also a NE of the
game G(b) and it is unique. The proof follows from the fact
that in the asymptotic regime, i.e., SNR→ 0, the set An and
the set Bn become identical, when n ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Moreover,
the sets Am, with m ∈ {5, . . . 8} become empty. The sets
A1, . . . ,A4 and the sets B1, . . . ,B8 are given by Prop. 10 and
Prop. 8, respectively. Then,
lim
SNR→0
A1 = lim
SNR→0
B1 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
> 1 and
g21
g22
6 1}
lim
SNR→0
A2 = lim
SNR→0
B2 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
> 1 and
g21
g22
> 1}
lim
SNR→0
A3 = lim
SNR→0
B3 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 1 and
g21
g22
6 1}
lim
SNR→0
A4 = lim
SNR→0
B4 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 1 and
g21
g22
> 1}
and moreover,
lim
SNR→0
A5 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
= 1 and
g21
g22
= 1},
and
∀n ∈ {6, . . . , 8}, lim
SNR→0
An = ∅. (53)
Now, since the sets A1, . . . ,A4 or the sets B1, . . . ,B4 cover,
in the asymptotic regime, all the space of vectors g and both
An and Bn determine a unique NE in the game G(b) and G(a),
respectively, it follows that the NE of both games is identical in
the asymptotic regime. The uniqueness of the NE in the game
G(a) holds with probability one, independently of the SNR
level (Prop. 8). In the game G(b), the NE is not unique if and
only if g ∈ A5. Nonetheless, since for all (k, s) ∈ K×S, gk,s
is a realization of a random variable drawn from a continuous
probability distribution, we have that
Pr (g ∈ A5) = 0. (54)
Thus, with probability one, the NE of the game G(b) is unique
at high SNR regime, which completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROP. 12
In this appendix, we provide the proof of Prop. 12, which
states that at the high SNR regime there always exists an NE
action profile in the game G(b), which leads to an equal or
better global performance than the unique NE of the game
G(a). Before we start, we introduce two lemmas which are
used in the proof.
Lemma 2: In the high SNR regime, the game G(a) possesses
a unique NE, which can be of six different types depending on
the channel realizations {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S :
• Equilibrium 1: if g ∈ B′1 = {g ∈ R4+ : g22 >
g12, and g21 6 g11}, then, p†11 = pmax and p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 4: if g ∈ B′4{g ∈ R4+ : g11 6
g21, and g12 > g22}, then, p†11 = 0 and p†22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 5: if g ∈ B′5 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 >
g21
g22
, and g21 > g11}, then, p†11 = pmax and p†22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2g22 +
σ2+g11pmax
g21
)
.
• Equilibrium 6: if g ∈ B′6 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
> g21g22 , and g22 < g12}, then, p
†
11 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ2g11 +
σ2+pmaxg22
g12
)
and p†22 = pmax.
• Equilibrium 7: if g ∈ B′7 = {g ∈ R4+ :
g11
g12
6 g21g22 , and g11 > g21}, then, p
†
11 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2+pmaxg21
g11
+ σ
2
g12
)
and p†22 = 0.
• Equilibrium 8: if g ∈ B′8 = {g ∈ R4+ : g11g12 6
g21
g22
, and g12 < g21}, then, p†11 = 0 and p†22 =
1
2
(
pmax − σ
2+g12pmax
g22
+ σ
2
g21
)
.
The proof of lemma 2 follows the same reasoning of the
proof of Prop 8. Here, ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, B′n = lim
SNR→∞
Bn,
where the sets B1, . . . ,B8 are given by Prop. 8.
In the following lemma, we describe the set of NE of the game
G(b) in the high SNR regime.
Lemma 3: In the high SNR regime, the game G(b) always
possesses two NE action profiles:
p∗,11 = (0, pmax) and p
∗,1
2 = (pmax, 0) (55)
and
p∗,41 = (pmax, 0) and p
∗,4
2 = (0, pmax), (56)
independently of the channel realizations.
Proof: In the high SNR, i.e., SNR → ∞, the sets
A1, . . . ,A4, given by Prop. 10, become the following sets,
lim
SNR→+∞
A1 = lim
SNR→+∞
A4 = R4+ (57)
lim
SNR→+∞
A2 = lim
SNR→+∞
A3 = ∅. (58)
Thus, one can immediately imply that
Pr
(
g ∈ lim
SNR→+∞
A2
)
= Pr
(
g ∈ lim
SNR→+∞
A3
)
= 0,
and,
Pr
(
g ∈ lim
SNR→+∞
A1
)
= Pr
(
g ∈ lim
SNR→+∞
A4
)
= 1.
Hence, from Prop. 10, we imply that both p(∗,1) and p(∗,4) are
NE action profiles of the game G(b) in the high SNR regime
regardless of the exact channel realizations {gij}∀(i,j)∈K×S ,
which completes the proof.
From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, it is easy to see that if
g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ B′n, with n ∈ {1, 4}, then (20)
holds since p† and at least one of the NE action profiles
p∗,n, with n ∈ {1, 4} are identical. In the cases where
g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) ∈ B′n, with n ∈ {5, . . . , 8}, we prove
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by inspection that in all the cases condition (20) always holds
for both NE action profiles p(∗,1) and p(∗,4). For instance,
assume that g ∈ B′5. Then, we have that the unique NE of
the game G(a) is p† = (p†11, pmax − p†11, pmax − p†22, p†22),
with p†11 = pmax and p
†
22 =
1
2
(
pmax +
σ2+pmaxg11
g21
− σ2g22
)
(See Lemma 2). Define the function ψ : R+ → R+ as
follows: ψ(x) = 1 + SNRx, with SNR = pmaxσ2 , and denote
by ∆1 (SNR), the difference between the NSE achieved by
playing G(a) and G(b), with respect to the NE p∗,1 at SNR
level SNR, i.e.,
∆1 (SNR) = u1
(
p∗,1
)
+ u2
(
p∗,1
)−(
u1
(
p†
)
+ u2
(
p†
))
= 2 log2 (2)− 2 log2
(
1 +
g21
g22
ψ(g22)
ψ(g11)
)
−
log2
(
1 +
g22
g21
ψ(g11)
ψ(g22)
)
+
log2
(
g21
g22
+ ψ(g21 − g11)
)
.
Note that if g ∈ B′5, then g21 > g11. Hence,
lim
SNR→∞
∆1 (SNR) = ∞,
which justifies (20). Similarly, denote ∆4 (SNR), the differ-
ence between the NSE achieved by playing G(a) and G(b), with
respect to the NE p∗,4, i.e.,
∆4 (SNR) = u1
(
p∗,4
)
+ u2
(
p∗,4
)−(
u1
(
p†
)
+ u2
(
p†
))
= 2 log2 (2)− 2 log2
(
1 +
g22
g21
ψ(g21)
ψ(g12)
)
− log2
(
1 +
g21
g22
ψ(g12)
ψ(g21)
)
(59)
+ log2
(
g22
g21
+ ψ(g22 − g12)
)
. (60)
Note that if g ∈ B′5, then g22 > g12. Hence,
lim
SNR→∞
∆4 (SNR) = ∞,
which justifies (20). Hence, one can imply that in the high
SNR regime both NE action profiles p∗,1 and p∗,2, satisfy
(20) when g ∈ B′5. The same result as the one obtained when
g ∈ B′5, is also obtained when g ∈ B′n, with n ∈ {6, . . . , 8},
which completes the proof.
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Fig. 3. Nash equilibrium action profiles as a function of the channel ratios
g11
g12
and g21
g22
for the two-player-two-channel game G(a) (left) and G(b) (right),
respectively. The function ψ : R+ → R+ is defined as follows: ψ(x) =
1+SNRx. The best response function BRk(p−k), for all k ∈ K, is defined
by (12). Here, it has been arbitrarly assumed that ψ(g11) < ψ(g21).
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Fig. 4. (a) Non-oriented graph and (b) oriented graph representing the game
G(b) with K = 3, S = 2, under the condition φ(p(2)) > φ(p(6)) >
φ(p(1)) > φ(p(5)) > φ(p(4)) > φ(p(7)) > φ(p(8)) > φ(p(3)). Total
number of vertices: SK = 8, number of neighbors per vertex: K(S−1) = 3.
Maximum Number of NE: 4. Number of NE: 2 (red vertices in (b)).
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Monte Carlo Simulations
Theoretical Result
Fig. 5. Fraction of players transmitting over channel s, with s ∈ S,
calculated using Monte-Carlo simulations and using Eq. (25) for a network
with S = 6 channels, K = 60 players, with b = (bs)∀s∈S =
(0.25, 0.11, 0.20, 0.05, 0.25, 0.14), and SNR = 10 log10
(
pmax
N0B
)
= 10
dB.
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System Load η = KS .
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Fig. 6. (a) Network spectral efficiency as a function of the SNR = pmax
σ2
in dBs. for the case of η = K
S
∈ { 1
2
, 1, 3
2
}, with K = 10. (b) Network
spectral efficiency as a function of the system load η = K
S
for different
SNR = pmax
σ2
levels in dBs.
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Fig. 7. Probability of observing a specific number of NE in the game G(b).
